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A. KEMP FISHERIES, INC. v. CASTLE & COOK, INC., BUMBLE BEE SEAFOODS DIVISION 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 25 July 1988 
852 F.2d493 
Parol evidence is inadmissible to determine the terms of a charter agreement where the agreement is not ambiguous and it 
is recognized by both parties as a final and complete embodiment of the terms. 
FACTS: Kemp Fisheries, Inc. (Kemp), and Bumble Bee 
Samoa Inc. (Bumble Bee), a fully owned subsidiary of Castle & 
Cooke, Inc. agreed that Kemp would charter, with an option to 
purchase, the MN City of San Diego. Kemp chartered the vessel 
to fish for herring and salmon in Alaska from April to August 
1983. In February, they signed a letter of intent which served as 
their agreement, "pending preparation and execution of final 
documentation required for the bareboat charter and option to 
purchase." 
Bumble Bee prepared the final bareboat charter agreement 
after reviewing drafts of it with Kemp's attorney. Kemp signed 
the agreement even though it did not provide for the engines to 
be in good working order, nor did it represent that the freezing 
system would be suitable for his needs, both of which Kemp 
thought would be arranged. The final agreement contained no 
such provisions, and in fact, disclaimed all warranties, express 
and implied. Despite his reservations, Kemp signed the agree­
ment without voicing his concerns to Bumble Bee. 
During the herring season two out of three engines that pow­
ered the freezing system broke down. Since Kemp could not 
freeze the fish properly, he had to sell them at lower prices. 
Kemp sued Bumble Bee in admiralty for breach of the charter 
agreement, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, 
and rescission, claiming that Bumble Bee agreed to provide 
engines in good working order and that the freezing system 
would meet its specific needs. 
The trial court found the charter agreement ambiguous, and 
admitted parol evidence to clarify the parties' intent. Bumble 
Bee was held liable because of the vessel's inablity to freeze 
herring and salmon resulting from Bumble Bee's breach of 
warranties. 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in admitting parol evidence to 
determine the terms of the charter agreement when all three 
parties had the opportunity to review and revise the agreement 
before signing it? 
ANALYSIS: In its reversal, the Ninth Circuit rendered judg­
ment for Bumble Bee because the charter agreement was an 
integrated contract. It was complete and comprehensive, and 
the letter of intent was a recognition by the parties that the 
charter would be the final documentation of their agreement. If 
a contract is integrated, "Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 
add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract," 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & R. Co., 
69 Cal. 2d 33,69 Cal. Rptr. 561,565,442 P.2d 641,645 ( 1968). 
"The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the 
meaning of a written instrument is ... whether the offered evi­
dence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of 
the instrument is reasonably susceptible. Trident Center v. Con· 
necticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564,570 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The charter agreement here, was not "reasonably susceptible " 
to the district court's interpretation that it warrants the sea­
worthiness of the vessel, the condition of the engines, and the 
capacity of the freezing system. 
Sub-paragraph 3B related to the condition of the ve.sse! prior 
to delivery. It guaranteed neither the accuracy of the survey nor 
the seaworthiness of the vessel. Sub-paragraphs 3E and F make 
it clear that Kemp's acceptance of delivery released Bumble Bee 
from responsibility for the vessel's condition and cannot be 
interpreted reasonably to warrant seaworthiness. Nor should 
the court have admitted evidence that Bumble Bee warranted 
the condition of the engines and the capacity of the freezing 
system because sub-paragraphs 3B, E, and F do not even mention 
them, and are not "reasonably susceptible" to that interpretation. 
The Court of Appeals emphasized that sub-paragraph 3E 
stated that after accepting delivery, "Kemp shall not be entitled 
to make or assert any claim against the owner on account of any 
representation or warranties, express or implied, regarding the 
vessel". Sub-paragraph 3F provided that Kemp's acceptance of 
the vessel was conclusive evidence that it inspected the vessel 
and "deemed" it seaworthy and suitable for its needs. The court 
(Continued .. .) 
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concluded that these clauses clearly and unequivocally com­
municated that the risk of unseaworthiness would fall on Kemp 
once it accepted the vessel. Bumble Bee effectively waived all 
warranties. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that Kemp and Bumble 
Bee are corporations familiar with business transactions. 
Kemp's attorney received the charter with Bumble Bee in the 
month before signing, and changes were incorporated into the 
final charter. These factors persuaded the court to hold that 
"nothing suggested that the agreement was not recognized by 
both parties as final and complete." 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment; 
Bumble Bee is not liable for Kemp's losses. 
Laura Dilimetin '90 
FMC CORPORATION v. MAJORIE LYKES AND LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 30 June 1988 
85 1  F.2d 78 
To determine the "customary freight unit" within the meaning of limitation of liability with respect to the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, the courts should examine the bill of lading and the filed tariff which expresses the contractual 
relationships of the parties. 
FACTS: In October 1982, the FMC Corporation <FMCl shipped 
30 small fire engines from Pennsylvania to Egypt on the SS 
Majorie Lykes under an agreement with the Lykes Brothers 
Steamship Company <Lykes). The carrier charged the shipper 
on a lump sum basis, and a description of the goods recited on 
the bill of lading was "30 Unboxed-Fire Engines". The same bill 
reflected a lump sum charge of "$4250/ea. x 30". There was no 
mention of value of the goods within the bill of lading. As the fire 
engines were being unloaded, Lykes dropped one engine onto 
two others destroying all three. FMC replaced the three fire 
engines at a total cbst of $ 165,254 and commenced an action in 
the district court seeking damages under the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act <COGSAl. 
After a bench trial, the district court found Lykes liable for 
the damage, recognizing that in the absence of declaration of 
value of goods in the bill of lading, COGSA limits the carriers 
liability to $500 per customary freight unit. 
The district court, seeking to determine what unit the parties 
actually used to compute the freight charged for the shipment, 
looked first to the bill of lading and the filed tariff. Both documents 
recited a lump sum rate, $4250 for each of the 30 fire engines. 
However, in attempting to discern the intent of the parties, the 
district court looked beyond these two documents and also con­
sidered the parties negotiations. 
Prior to arriving at the agreed lump sum shipping rate, the 
parties had negotiated for a rate based on a weight/measurement 
unit of 40 cubic feet. They assumed that each fire engine 
measured 1700 cubic feet, although as it turned out later, the 
actual measurement was 1522.5 cubic feet. Lykes initially of­
fered to ship the freight at $165 for each 40 cubic foot unit and 
later reduced its offer to $ 125 per unit. Before measuring the fire 
engines to determine the actual number of cubic feet involved, 
the parties agreed to a lump sum rate of $4250 per fire engine. 
FMC contended that this lump sum figure was arrived at by 
multiplying a rate of $100 per weight/measurement unit by 
42.5, the number of 40 cubic foot units in an assumed 1700 cubic 
feet fire engine. Based on the negotiations, the district court 
concluded that the customary freight for this shipment was 40 
cubic feet, that there were 127.5 units in the three damaged fire 
engines, and thus at $500 per unit, that Lykes was liable for 
$63,750. 
ISSUE: Whether in determining a "customary freight unit" 
within the meaning of the limitation of liability provision of 
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COGSA (46 U.S.C. App. § 1304 (5)), the court should examine 
prior negotiations as well as the bill of lading and filed tariff? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re­
versed the district courts decision because the bill of lading and 
the filed tariff were conclusive on the question of the customary 
freight unit for this shipment and entered a judgment of $1500 
for the plaintiff. 
The limitation of liability provision of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. App. 
§ 1304 (5) provides that "neither the carrier nor the ship shall in 
any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in 
connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceed­
ing $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in 
the case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight 
unit, ... " 
FMC could have eliminated the limitation of liability by 
declaring a higher value of the goods in the bill of lading. In this 
case, no value at all was declared in the bill. Since the fire 
engines were not shipped in packages, the carriers liability is 
limited to the $500 per "customary freight unit." The question 
presented, therefore is, what is the "customary freight unit?" 
The cases discussing the meaning of "customary freight unit" 
are inconsistent. While some courts have held that the customary 
freight unit is the measurement "customarily" used to calculate 
the rate to be charged, the Second Circuit has taken a different 
approach. In the Second Circuit the customary freight unit is 
the actual freight unit used by the parties to calculate freight for 
the shipment at issue. Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M. V. Ned­
lloyd Rotterdam, 759 F.2d 1006, 1016 <2d Cir.l cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 229 88 L.Ed 220 < 1985!. 
In this case the description of the goods recited on the bill of 
lading and filed tariff was clear. Where there is no ambiguity in 
either the bill of lading or the tariff, there is no need for the 
district court to consider any of the parties earlier negotiations, 
and in doing so, the district court erred. 
Thus, the intent of the parties as to the customary freight unit 
is the Second Circuit standard, and in determining that intent 
the courts must look to the bill of lading and the tariff. Absent 
any ambiguity there, the inquiry is ended, and both parties are 
bound to the freight unit therein adopted. This rule provides 
certainty and fairness to both sides. The intended freight unit is 
set forth in the bill of lading, and before shipment either party 
could require that a different unit be expressed. 
Glenn T. Henneberger '91 
